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Introduction 
 
It is possible to tell many stories of the multilayered and multifaceted city that is Ahmedabad, 
located in the state of Gujarat in western India. One story can be constructed out of the rise 
and decline of the textile industry, of the growth and the decimation of one of the largest 
industrial working classes in India, and of the informalisation of labour that followed the 
dissolution of this working class. We could tell a second story; that of a distinct and alterative 
experiment in trade unionism. The Mazdoor Mahajan Sangh or the Textile Labour 
Association that was inaugurated by Gandhi embodied the Gandhian principles of trust and 
partnership between capital and labour, rather than that of irreconcilable class contradictions. 
We could tell a third story that centres on the way the city has successfully negotiated two 
major economic transitions: from a trade oriented economy to an industrial economy, and 
from an industrial to a post-industrial economy. We could tell a fourth story, of how 
Ahmedabad was constituted as the crucible of nation building in India with the establishment 
of the Sabarmati Ashram by Gandhi, with the founding of the Gujarat Vidyapeeth 
(university), the Navjivan Trust, the prestigious Indian Institute of Management, and the 
equally prestigious National Institute of Design. We could also tell a fifth story of the city, 
how and why it became the site for Gandhi’s experiments in truth and his earnest efforts to 
persuade people belonging to different castes and religious persuasions to live together. The 
city also gained fame because it was here that Gandhi began the famous Salt Satyagraha, 
which arguably represented the highpoint in the struggle for freedom. We could also narrate a 
fascinating story of why Gandhi did not go back to Ahmedabad after the salt satyagraha, 
though he had lived there for most of the 1920s. All these stories are not only absorbing in 
their own right; they provide fertile ground for social science research. However, there is one 
other gloomy and bleak tale that can be told of Ahmedabad; how and why the city leads the 
country in the scale and the number of communal riots between the Hindu and Muslim 
communities.  
 
This paper is a contribution to the work of the ‘cities and fragile states’ component of the 
Crisis States Research Programme1 and seeks to explain and account for the prevalence of 
communal violence in the city.  The paper deals with the spatial aspect of the phenomenon: 
the ghettoisation of the Muslim community. The notion of the ghetto symbolises many 
messages, all of which are appalling. On the face of it, the term ‘ghetto’ simply implies that 
members of a particular community have chosen to live together in a confined spatial 
location. But ghettos do not originate as an act of free will, or as a result of the free choice of 
people to live among their own, or to live precisely there; in that very place. The origin of the 
                                                 
1 I wish to express my gratitude to James Putzel, Jo Beall and Wendy Foulds at the Crisis States Research Centre 
for their support with this project. Praveen Priyadarshi, Silky Tyagi, and Neha Khanna carried out field work in 
Ahmedabad, and assembled primary and secondary source material for this research project and without their 
help, this paper could not have been written.  The mistakes and the flaws in the paper remain mine.  
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ghetto lies in the fear and anxiety of people that they are - and will be - targeted, stigmatised 
and subjected to unbearable violence just because they belong to community X as opposed to 
community Y. Beleaguered communities flock to the ghetto in search of sanctuary. These 
constricted and claustrophobic spatial settlements might look like the nd goal of the 
Hobbesian search for basic self preservation but the ghetto is not a refuge and the security it 
provides is purely illusive. In abnormal times the ghetto provides an easy target for acts of 
aggression. In normal times, the residents of the ghetto continue to be stigmatised and 
deprived of both rights and civic amenities that are the due of every citizen. In Ahmedabad, 
Muslim ghettos - and there is no other kind of ghetto in the city - are typed by other residents 
as mini-Pakistan’s, and the road between these sadly impoverished and denuded localities and 
other areas is construed as the ‘border’. Given the historical record of hostility between India 
and Pakistan, the implications are clear. The residents of the ghetto are the enemy; there can 
be no other relation with them but that of hostility. 
 
There are other messages conveyed by the ghetto; the spatial marginalisation of an entire 
population, denial of basic rights and civic amenities, and the reduction of their status as 
citizen to one of subject.  An entire group is, in the process, rendered politically irrelevant. 
The built environment of the ghetto, to put the point across starkly, can be seen as a spatial 
manifestation of the exclusion and the disempowerment of an entire section of citizens in a 
society that claims democratic credentials. In this essay I want to concentrate on one type of 
ghetto in Ahmedabad, the resettlement colony, in order to work out the implications of the 
notion of the political pact outlined by James Putzel and the research team on ‘development 
as state-making’ at the Crisis States Research Centre. 
 
 
Of Political Pacts 
 
Putzel distinguishes between the factors that enhance the resilience of a state, and those 
factors that enable states to develop the capacity to negotiate economic growth and poverty 
reduction. (Putzel 2007). State resilience, proposes Putzel, depends crucially on (a) the 
inclusiveness of bargains struck among elites and (b) the extent to which state organisations, 
particularly those responsible for security and taxation, have established their presence 
throughout the country’s territory.  He suggests that along with effective state presence, the 
existence of a pact among political elites, (which is presumably arrived at through processes 
of intensive bargaining) necessarily imparts to the state a certain modicum of stability, and 
provides what can be termed a ‘holding together’ mechanism. The condition is that the 
consensus should be inclusive. That is, the pact should reflect and codify the interests of most, 
if not all the elites. Once political elites enter into a political pact, and once the state acquires 
the capacity to hold society together through monopoly over security and tax administration, 
we can reasonably expect that the society in question will not be wracked by periodic crisis, 
which poses a threat to its very existence and reproduction. 
 
Let me expand on Putzel’s argument and dwell on the implications of the notion of inclusive 
political pacts.  For one, it is more than obvious that no political pact, however inclusive it 
may be, can ever be carved in stone. There is, in politics, absolutely no notion of an original 
Hobbesian social contract, which once arrived at governs the lives, the work habits, the social 
relations, and the fate of successive generations in perpetuity. For even as new problems and 
issues are catapulted onto the political horizon, the political pact will have to be renegotiated 
in order to lay down new rules of the new game. Take as an example the increasing 
importance of the environment in political discourses, which has radically, if not wholly, 
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transformed practices of the appropriation and the use of natural resources such as forests, 
water, and land. If women’s struggles for a fair share of the parental property have resulted in 
the reformulation of property rights that constitute the staple of the market order, affirmative 
action policies for the doubly disadvantaged have considerably transformed notions of merit 
and competition, which is another mainstay of a market oriented social and economic order. 
In India, the rise of caste based parties which shun the notion of inclusive territorial 
representation, and which argue strenuously for group interests, have completely transformed 
the rules of a competitive party system. It follows that as political understanding and practices 
change, these changes will have to be reflected in the constitution of the political pact; 
otherwise the latter will simply become redundant. 
 
Further, it is more than likely that over time new elites acquire political significance and older 
elites lose out on this front. Elite formation and reformation is a constantly shifting process; 
the product of technological changes, new forms of production, and new labour processes, all 
of which result in new power equations. These transformations necessarily call for new 
political pacts, new bargains, and new bargaining strategies. In other words, even if political 
elites have to be relevant in and for that society; political relevance can prove both fluid and 
mutable. The political and the moral clout of, say, landowners in a feudal society, declines 
somewhat rapidly in an industrial society in which land becomes a factor of production, rent, 
and profit, rather than a source of economic, social, and juridical power. In an industrial 
order, as Marx was to remind us long ago, the two politically significant classes are the 
owners of capital and the owners of labour power, and these confront each other in the market 
place as the buyer and as the seller of commodities. Consider how in a post-industrial 
globalised economy and a society based on new technologies, capitalists and workers who are 
unable to make the transition to new systems of production and new labour processes rapidly 
go to seed. Who would have thought in the heyday of industrial capitalism that those who 
specialise in the production and dissemination of knowledge and information would one day 
stand squarely at the centre of the production process the way they do today? Furthermore, as 
has become painfully evident, in post-industrial economies the blue collar working class just 
does not possess the same degree of political significance and thereby relevance, for a variety 
of reasons: the informalisation of labour, the decline of the organised working class, the rise 
of new labour processes that demand new skills and new management techniques, and the 
pervasiveness of globalised capital. Since the bargaining power of this section of the working 
class has declined sharply; it is no longer considered a necessary partner in the refashioned 
political pact.  
 
Political pacts are, in sum, ephemeral entities. If the pact does not reflect and register the rise 
and decline or the dominance and weaknesses of political elites, then that society is bound to 
lapse into instability. Marx has commented famously that when the forces of production 
outstrip the relations of production, societies go into crisis. This insight can be read as a 
powerful comment on the relevance and the irrelevance of political elites. In sum, the political 
pact needs to reflect changing balances of power and informal shifting alignments, otherwise 
it becomes superfluous. The nature of the political pact, in other words, is radically different, 
at different times, in the same society.  
  
Therefore, when Putzel refers to political elites, he obviously means those elites who happen 
to be politically significant at a particular moment of time. As elites decline or are 
reconstituted in new modes, or as new elites appear on the horizon, the political pact itself has 
to be reformulated in order to safeguard the interests of a new category of elites. The 
assumption of course is that any pact both reflects and codifies the interests of the politically 
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relevant section of the population. It follows that the capacity of a political pact to lend 
stability to a society, and enhance the durability of a state, depends to what extent this pact 
can expand or contract, be refashioned or reworked, to accommodate the interests of currently 
significant political elites. Putzel’s point that the stability of a society depends upon the 
degree to which the political pact can both accommodate and represent the interests of elites, 
is perfectly valid. But what was generically termed the ‘circulation of elites’ in the late 
nineteenth century has to be taken into account. Therefore, the pact itself needs to be adjusted 
and fine tuned to keep in touch with new developments. The process of arriving at an elite 
consensus through a political process of negotiation and bargaining may be far more fleeting 
and shifting than assumed at first glance. Consider for instance the disastrous consequences 
that follow when a section of elites, who are no longer relevant to collective life, attempt to 
dominate society. This is after all the stuff of which the French Revolution was made in the 
eighteenth century.  
 
The notion of political significance can be interpreted in at least two ways. Political elites can 
be conceptualised in terms of their formation, dissolution, and reformation. The emergence 
and the consolidation of a set of elites, is, in this sense highly dependent upon the economic 
profile of the society at hand. In a classic class based model of elites in the developing world, 
we would, for instance, include the political and the bureaucratic class which has acquired a 
disproportionate historical role in developing societies, the landowners who remain important 
because one economic system has not made way for another, the owners of domestic capital, 
and the owners of trans-national capital. Also included in the political pact would be 
international agencies such as the WTO, the World Bank, the IMF, trans-national banks and 
donor agencies, and global NGOs. Developing societies appear to straddle both time and 
space, since they contain elites that belong to different sorts of social configurations, different 
sorts of organisational establishments, and even different economic systems.  It goes without 
saying that the pact will include elites grounded in different forms of power.  
 
The notion of politically significant elites acquires, however, a completely different 
dimension in ethnically plural and divided societies. Here elites who represent distinctive 
ethnic groups and their interests will have to be included in the pact, if this pact has to endure. 
The ethnicity based model of elite representation in decision making bodies, has been 
classically termed consociationalism. In its current avatar, this model is referred to as the 
‘mirror theory of representation’. According to this theory, politically salient ethnic groups 
should be represented in decision making bodies in direct proportion to their share of the 
population, irrespective of whether the group in question is oppressed or dominated by the 
majority group. It is more important that the leadership of the group be represented at the site 
at which decisions are made. 
 
There is, in sum, considerable virtue in James Putzel’s proposition that the stability of a 
society is dependent upon, among other things, the existence of a consensus among political 
elites, for the following reasons. One, participation in processes of decision making, and in 
particular the power to veto any proposed legislation which has some bearing upon the group 
represented by the elite, transforms leaders of an ethnic group into stake holders in the 
system. Two, even if the outcome of the decision making process is not approved by a 
particular group, the leaders can hardly complain, provided they have been given a fair chance 
to participate in the deliberations that precede the taking of decisions, and provided that they 
have been offered an equally fair opportunity to influence the decision. That is what matters is 
the equal opportunity to participate in the processes whereby decisions are taken. Three, very 
many vexatious issues have been resolved by incorporating the elite of particularly 
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troublesome groups into the ruling coalition. One can, after all, hardly complain of 
oppression, if one is a stakeholder in the system that oppresses.  Four, if the coalition of elites 
arrives at a political consensus on the rules of the game and on their own stakes in the system, 
there is far less likelihood that the balance and the stability of a given society will be 
threatened at any given point in time.  
 
However, I would suggest that there are various preconditions that must be addressed before a 
viable political pact can be reached through processes of bargaining, and be signed and 
sealed, if not for perpetuity, then at least for the immediate future. One, the participants have 
to exhibit the virtue of prescience and recognise that the pact has to be constantly renegotiated 
and adjusted to address both pressing issues that may be relatively new to the political 
agenda, and new elites. Two, the coalition of political elites must be sharp enough to be aware 
both of the decline, if any, of some of its members, the rising political significance of new 
groups, and the need to incorporate these groups into the pact. Atul Kohli has argued, for 
instance, that the success of India’s democracy is largely due to the fact that the claims of new 
political elites have been neutralised by incorporating some of them into the system (Kohli 
2001). Three, all elites that represent significant groups must be given a fair opportunity to 
participate in the system. Let me elaborate the third point because it may be of some 
importance for the notion of elite bargains, or political pacts among elites. A political pact can 
only be inclusive, if a particular ethnic group has not been marginalised, rendered politically 
irrelevant, or simply not recognised as a worthy partner.  
 
That exclusionary political pacts can generate serious consequences can be foretold and it is 
precisely this recognition that underlies Putzel’s insistence on inclusive political pacts. For 
instance, much of the armed struggle in the Kashmir Valley erupted in the late 1980s because 
one national political party - the Congress - and one state party - the National Conference - 
simply did not allow the entry of other groups into the electoral arena. The 1984 and 1987 
elections to the state assembly were so heavily rigged against relative newcomers to the 
electoral process, that these contestants were forced to take up arms against an extremely 
discriminatory and corrupt system. Structures of opportunity were, in other words, heavily 
tilted against new groups seeking to enter the electoral system in the Kashmir Valley, as much 
as they were tilted against the Tamil community in Sri Lanka, when the Tamil language was 
downgraded in the nineteen fifties. The cause of the civil war that wracked Sri Lanka for 
twenty six years was exclusionary linguistic politics. The discontent that erupted around the 
politics of language could have been predicted. If out of a plurality of languages one language 
is privileged as the official language; the non-speakers of the official language are 
disadvantaged in a number of different but overlapping ways.2 This fact should be more than 
obvious. People who speak the language used in educational institutions as a medium of 
instruction, in government jobs and transactions, in deliberative forums, in decision making 
processes, in the legislature, in the judiciary, and in the government owned media, will 
possess a rankly unfair advantage over non-speakers of the language. The latter will have to 
invest in the learning of a language if they want to take advantage of the structure of 
opportunities available in that society. If narrowly conceived linguistic policies make access 
to material opportunities difficult for the non-speakers of that language, the devaluation of a 
language also leads to the depreciation of identities, downgrading of epistemic systems and 
dismissal of the symbolic resources of the linguistic community. Moreover, citizens whose 
language has been devalued are unfairly disadvantaged in the public sphere, because debates 
in this space are conducted within the conceptual and the symbolic framework constituted by 
                                                 
2 Tamil was reinstated as the official language in 1978. 
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the dominant/official language. The right of the non-speakers of the language to take part in 
the debates in the public sphere as equals is simply curtailed. If the non-speakers of the 
official language are settled in a discrete piece of territory, discontent can easily translate into 
secessionist movements. This was the precise case in Sri Lanka, where Tamil speakers were 
denied fair opportunities to participate in the formation of skills and training, which are 
essential for a competitive market economy. Although the status of Tamil was restored as an 
official language in 1978, the measure came too late and amounted to little. 
 
Therefore, Putzel’s argument that the political pact among a coalition of elites has to be 
inclusive, or that the pact must incorporate the interests of politically significant agents is 
perfectly valid. The problem arises when structures and processes prevent the formation of 
new political elites, or systemically disempower certain groups. The net consequences of such 
exclusion are that the leaders of the group are simply not in a position to participate in the 
bargains that result in a political pact. Political pacts can be exclusionary not only because 
some groups are left out deliberately, but when they are not recognised as significant. 
Political pacts can exclude because some groups have been systematically discriminated 
against and marginalised. In most cases an exclusionary rather than an inclusive political pact 
among elites has led to instability, armed struggle and societal breakdown as in the case of the 
Kashmir Valley and Sri Lanka. But ironically enough there are also cases in which 
exclusionary political pacts that systematically disempower and disprivilege a particular 
group result in political stability. This is precisely the  case in Ahmedabad.  
 
Despite the fact that Ahmedabad holds the record of being one of India’s most violent cities, 
since 2002 when the most horrific violence was wreaked upon the Muslim community by the 
cadres of the Hindu Right, there has been no indication of further communal tension. The 
Muslim question seems to have been ‘resolved’ by the Hindu right, mainly by forcing the 
minority community to accept that if it has to live in a state dominated by the religious right, 
then it has to comply with dominant rules.3 A community from which once Ahmedabad’s 
ruling classes, court officials, and skilled crafts persons and weavers were drawn, and a 
community that formed an important component of the working class in industrialised 
Ahmedabad, has been rendered quiescent and perhaps even politically irrelevant, through 
processes that essentially involve the employment of violence. Muslims in Ahmedabad form 
fifteen percent of the population, and by all standards of democracy should be represented in 
the political pact that lays down the rules of the game. As suggested above, inclusion of 
minority ethnic groups into the pact neutralises discontent and can serve to ‘buy out’ the 
leaders of the group. In Ahmedabad this is not even considered necessary, because the 
community itself has been so thoroughly disempowered. The stability that has ensued may be 
purely illusionary and purely transient since political pacts are by nature time bound and 
exclusionary political pacts even more so.  This remains to be seen.  
 
In sum, our study of Ahmedabad illustrates two aspects of elite pacts or bargains. On the one 
hand, the city has been able to make two rather important economic transitions - from a 
trading to an industrial centre, and from an industrial centre to a globalised service economy - 
successfully. The changing political composition of the elite is reflected in the renegotiated 
political pact. If at one time the pact was one between the owners of the textile industry and 
the working class, it now reflects the interests of a globalised capitalist class, the service 
sector in the economy, and owners of financial capital. What is not present today is the 
formerly organised working class, much of which is now unorganised and which works in the 
                                                 
3 Interviews with various Muslim citizens in the city.  Their names have been withheld at their request. 
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informal economy. The ability of the political elites in the city to enter into new forms of 
agreement, and on new terms, is the success story of Ahmedabad, and one that offers some 
lessons to other societies seeking to make economic transitions successfully.  
 
The second aspect of the elite pact is how the Muslim minority in the city has been 
thoroughly marginalised. The leaders of the community are just not considered important 
enough to be included in the political pact. At one point an important component of the 
trading economy and of the industrial working class, today the Muslims of Ahmedabad live in 
poverty and want, in desolate ghettos and resettlement colonies that at one and the same time 
evoke hateful representations and supreme neglect.  In these ghettos they are denied the basic 
rights of citizenship relegated as they are to the spatial, economic and political margins of the 
city.  
 
These two stories, of successful economic transitions and of the ‘successful’ marginalisation 
of an entire body of the citizens, tells us about two kinds of political pacts. One pact codes an 
agreement on how economic transitions can be managed successfully. The second pact codes 
agreements on which section of social elites can be included in the transition, and which are 
left out through the institutionalisation of processes prior to the pact. In a significant sense 
both  pacts are based not on inclusion but on the exclusion of the Muslim minority.  In the 
next section I will seek to map out these exclusions by studying one dimension of this 
marginalisation: the ghettoisation of Muslims, with ghettos standing in for exclusion, the 
herding together of populations, and the denial of access  to both structures of opportunity and 
to partnership in political pacts.  
 
 
The Making of Ahmedabad as a Segmented City 
   
The Muslim community in Ahmedabad began moving to ghettos in 1969 after a major 
communal riot had shaken the city. In this riot ninety percent of the people who were killed 
belonged to the Muslim community (Shah 1970).  By the 1980s the ghettoisation process had 
intensified and by the 1990s only a few mixed neighbourhoods remained (Yagnik and Sheth 
2005: 230) It was these Muslim inhabited areas and some mixed neighbourhoods that were 
systematically and brutally targeted in the violence of March 2002, the worst affected areas 
being on either side of the railway track in old Ahmedabad. Settlements were burnt down, 
individuals were brutally tortured and murdered, and women were subjected to gang rape by 
mobs numbering sometimes ten to twenty thousand.  An estimated two thousand people were 
killed in the state of Gujarat and out of this number one thousand were murdered in 
Ahmedabad alone. A majority of those killed were Muslims (Chenoy et al 2002).  
 
The victims of violence were herded into poorly funded and grossly inadequate relief camps 
mainly set up by Muslim religious organisations. Twenty relief camps were set up in the city, 
and some of the bigger camps, such as the Shah Alam camp housed between eight and nine 
thousand refugees. The Concerned Citizen’s Tribunal reported that in March 2002, ninety-
eight thousand Muslim refugees sought sanctuary in the camps (Concerned Citizens Tribunal 
2002). By May-July 2002, the camps were being rapidly wound up by the government and the 
inhabitants, after being given pathetically inadequate funds as ‘compensation’ sometimes as 
low as Rs 1200, were now on their own and thrown onto the mercy of a society that had 
proved complicit in the carnage, either actively or through studied silence. The state 
government, recognising neither the plight, nor the needs of the victims of communal 
violence, simply refused to take any action which would help these people to rebuild their 
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shattered lives. Some of the refugees went back to their homes, others migrated out of the 
state, and according to the Citizens Tribunal report, an estimated 13,482 refugees continued to 
live in the relief camps that were now being run informally. About a quarter of the displaced, 
fearing renewed threats by organisations on the religious right were reluctant to go back to 
their original homes. Yet, the state government refused to rehabilitate these refugees in new 
and safe locations. 
 
 At this point a few civil society organisations, predominantly Islamic ones such as the 
Tabligh Jamaat, the Jamaat-e-Islami, and the Jamiaat-el-Ulema-e-Hind took over. In 
particular, the Islamic Relief Committee (the relief wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami) stepped in to 
help people relocate and resettle. Some land was acquired on the outskirts of the city and the 
victims were resettled in four pockets - Juhapura, Ramol, Vatva and Dani Limda. All of these 
‘colonies’ are on the periphery of Ahmedabad and are poorly connected to the city itself 
where most of the jobs are generated. The seven hundred and twenty nine households that 
have been relocated in fifteen such colonies in Ahmedabad have been displaced mainly from 
eastern Ahmedabad, from areas such as Naroda Patia, Gomtipur, Daria Pur, Gomti Pur, 
Saraspur, Bapu Nagar Jamal Pur, Rakhial, and other inner city areas that have repeatedly 
suffered from periodic outbursts of communal violence since 1969 (Chandhoke et al 2007) . 
The status of the land upon which these shanty towns have been constructed is, however, 
legally uncertain, because the state government has earmarked it as agricultural land. Some 
Muslim organisations bought this land to settle the refugees, but the use of agricultural land to 
resettle displaced Muslims can be contested by the government. The shaky status of the land 
has instilled dread among the residents that they still live in temporary settlements, which can 
be easily mowed down by the bulldozers of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. Long 
term fears are compounded by the exigencies of everyday life. Not only are most resettlement 
colonies remotely located from the city where jobs are to be found; they are far away from 
schools and health clinics that are an indispensable prerequisite of living a life of minimal 
dignity. In these bare, stark, inhospitable areas, civil society organisations constructed rackety 
one room tenements, without water supply, without electricity, without access to internal 
roads because there were none, and without sanitation and sewerage for families. It is here, in 
these barren spaces, that some of the victims of the carnage in Ahmedabad have been settled, 
and expected to begin their life anew, amidst even more deprivation than they faced in their 
original habitats. A new phase in ghettoisation has thus been earmarked. 
 
Many of these families still own houses and land in their original habitats, even if these 
houses have been burnt down. But even as bitter memories of the brutal violence that was 
inflicted upon them and their families and community haunts collective psyches, people fear 
to go back to their homes.  They prefer to live in these desolate ugly, and rundown one room 
tenements that house as many as five members of a family. But this is not the major problem 
that confronts refugees. Other and much more serious problems stalk everyday life of the 
inhabitants of these settlements. For instance, in the resettlement colony ironically called the 
‘Citizens Nagar’ in Dani Limda, families who once lived in the most communally hit area of 
Ahmadabad; Naroda Patia, have been resettled. This particular ‘citizen’s’ colony has been 
built literally in the shadow of a massive mountain. The only problem is that this mountain 
has been constructed out of garbage collected from every part of Ahmedabad and more 
garbage is dumped at the foothills of the mountain every morning. The stack of garbage 
dominates the collective life of the inhabitants. The stench that emanates from it overwhelms 
both the senses and sensibilities of people who live not only in the colony, but also in the 
surrounding areas. More critically, during the monsoons, the garbage overflows the dump, 
runs through what passes for roads within the colony, and enters homes. The garbage, which 
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is highly toxic, has penetrated the ground water. Since the inhabitants of the colony do not 
have access to clean drinking water, they are forced to consume this contaminated ground 
water. This yellow, grimy, and filthy water is so polluted that it cannot but be the harbinger of 
terrible and life threatening disease and unsurprisingly gastro-intestinal diseases are rampant 
in this locality. Despite repeated representations by some civil society groups the Ahmedabad 
Municipal Corporation (AMC) has made no attempt to look for an alternate site for the 
dumping of city garbage. To make matters worse, residents complain that the AMC often 
deposits carcasses of dead animals around the colonies. The revolting odour makes the place 
simply unbearable.   
 
The plight of the residents who have been subjected to involuntary displacement does not end 
there. When the AMC begins to burn the garbage in the dump once in a while, the pollutant 
ridden smoke, which pervades every pore of the body, leads to all kinds of health problems; 
particularly respiratory diseases. Yet the AMC, which is responsible for providing services to 
citizens, has refused to take notice of the deplorable condition of this colony or of the 
appalling lives led by the victims of violence who live there.  
   
Built as they were in a hurry, these so called houses are in dreadful condition, water seeps into 
the rooms during the monsoons, and rubbish flows along what passes for internal roads. 
These houses have low roofs that heats up in the summer and have no windows or any kind of 
ventilation. These makeshift tenements have been provided with temporary and unsafe 
electrical wiring. The land these houses are built in is generally low lying, and therefore water 
logging is common. The situation is worsened by the fact that there is absolutely no drainage 
system, no paved pavements, or street lighting in the so called colony. Vulnerable and 
insecure as the families already are; the highly depressing and sorry surroundings in which 
they are forced to live, has resulted in both helplessness and alienation. These sentiments are 
exacerbated by the fact that the government practically refuses to recognise these settlements, 
and therefore no aid to make these colonies habitable, to build schools, and health clinics, or 
provide for transportation to the city where people can work, is forthcoming.  
 
The legitimacy of a democratically elected government rests upon its ability to take care of 
the worse off in society. In Ahmedabad, as in the rest of the state, the government does not 
even acknowledge these responsibilities. Similar problems attend other resettlement colonies. 
Since most of these colonies are on the outskirts of the city, they are surrounded by industries 
that spew pollutants, all of which makes the areas hazardous for human habitation. In 
Sundaram Nagar in Bapu Nagar, for example, cotton dust emanating twice a day from the 
burning of industrial waste, makes breathing difficult for the residents. Both children and 
adults that we met have developed lung related diseases. 
 
The residents of most of these resettlement colonies eke out a bare existence without any 
basic amenities, be it drinking water, sanitation, drainage, primary health centres, schools for 
children, or approach roads and modes of transportation. Children have been forced to drop 
out of school and take to daily wage labour, because it is too expensive to hire transport to 
take children to school. Residents of Ekta Nagar complained that they have to pay twelve 
rupees daily to send their children to the nearest school, and since they cannot afford this, the 
children have dropped out of school. Most families are terrified of sending their daughters to 
school outside the neighbourhood, following the sexual violence that Muslim girls have been 
subjected to after 2002.  A few colonies were given  child care centres more than five years 
after they were established, but no schools for children have been set up. Resultantly, an 
entire generation of children who are less educated than their parents is growing up in these 
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ramshackle tenements. Is this not a denial of every child’s basic right to education? Health 
care for the victims of the communal violence is equally deplorable. There are barely any 
primary health centres available for these colonies. There have been instances when due to an 
absence of health facilities, patients have died on the way to remote hospitals and babies have 
often been delivered on the road. 
 
One major consequence of the establishment of resettlement colonies in spatially isolated 
areas is that people have been forced to abandon their previous vocations and look for 
alternative employment. Most of them now work in informal and petty jobs, and are casual 
labourers. Whereas most of the men work as auto and cycle rickshaw pullers, petty vendors, 
and casual workers in nearby neighborhoods, women work mostly as domestic help. 
Consequently there has been a universal decline in income that has dropped to less than half 
to what people used to earn before the violence and relocation. The drop in income has not 
only led to extreme pauperisation, but the ramifications of poverty can be seen in a new wave 
of child labour and the growth of a generation of illiterate and unskilled youth.  
  
The response of the state government to the needs, the grievances, and the woes of the victims 
of communal violence has been negligent at best and vicious at worst. Six years after the 
pogrom, many of the relocated families were still awaiting their voters’ identity cards and 
Below Poverty Line (BPL) ration cards. Earlier in 2007, after a massive meeting of the 
internally displaced, the election commission took measures to ensure that the displaced were 
able to cast their votes in the forthcoming state assembly elections, but the attitude of local 
state functionaries can best be described as sheer indifference. Most families have not been 
provided with documentation that will allow them to access subsidised food for ‘Below 
Poverty Line’ families, and relief cards for the poor. Since these documents are crucial if 
citizens want to benefit from social protection schemes, most of the residents lose out. 
Ironically, residents of New Fazal Nagar, one of the relocated colonies, have been served a 
notice to pay eight thousand rupees as house tax; even though their houses lie beyond the pale 
of the government or of the Corporation.  
 
Since the state government continues to be in denial, non governmental and other civil society 
organisations have stepped in to support the victims of communal violence. A small group of 
such organisations has done a commendable job in resettling victims of communal violence, 
and it is because of their concerted effort that these people have been able to survive, but a 
majority of civil society organisations have proved indifferent to the cause. The cloud of right 
wing extremism continues to hang heavily on civil society organisations, which often fear 
withdrawal of state funding. Resettlement of the refugees was made possible because the 
Islamic Relief Committee and a few organisations such as Action Aid devoted both resources 
and energy to the task. The role played by some of the civil society organisations has been 
highly commendable, and the victims of the 2002 carnage gratefully acknowledge these 
efforts. Organisations such as the Aman Biradri and Jan Vikas have waged a long battle 
against the indifferent attitude of the state agencies towards relocation of the victims of 
violence.  Further, these organisations have meticulously documented the callous attitude of 
the state towards the displaced. Armed with these resources, the displaced families have been 
able to press for their rights, and to put their demands before the government at the local 
level. It is due entirely to these organisations that the plight of the victims has not been 
subsumed completely in the state sponsored din about a ‘globalised Gujarat’.   
 
For instance, on 1 February 2007, the Antarik Visthapit Haq Rakshak Samiti (Society for the 
protection of the rights of the displaced), the Centre for Social Justice and ANHAD, along 
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with several others organised the ‘Convention of the Internally Displaced’ in Gujarat. At the 
convention, thousands of internally displaced persons demanded ‘recognition, reparation and 
rehabilitation’. Discussions on several issues and problems, such as the livelihoods of the 
internally displaced, discrimination, exclusion, and economic boycotts, police intimidation, 
the specific problems of children, youth and women, served to highlight several crucial 
issues. At least the convention could expose the lie of the state government that it has 
rehabilitated the ‘riot’ victims. The Convention also provided the victims with a forum to 
share their troubles and come together to fight these predicaments. Apart from the demand for 
the provision of basic amenities and livelihood, the convention suggested forcefully that there 
should be a national policy for rehabilitation for people displaced due to communal violence. 
One positive outcome of this convention was that the election commission recognised that the 
inhabitants of these colonies should get election cards, even though they could not establish 
residence because they had not been given the required documents by the agencies that 
relocated them. The second positive outcome was hope that these families will be given BPL 
ration cards, even though they cannot provide proof of residence, such as sale deeds, rental 
receipts, or electricity bills. 
 
However, private initiatives in resettling such massive numbers of the displaced cannot 
substitute for state action. For one, given the limited resources at the disposal of these 
agencies, relocation has been partial and insufficient, and falls short of the requirements of the 
residents. Neither the poorly constructed houses, nor the pathetic state of facilities and 
services, can give the victims a sense of security, or a feeling that they are being compensated 
for a major lapse of justice. Secondly, the building of residential colonies on land that has 
been marked for agricultural activities not only makes the future an uncertain one, it also 
gives the civic agency a pretext to deny basic amenities to what are typed as unauthorised 
colonies.  
 
Two more consequences should be noted here because these are of some import. One,  the 
resettlement of the displaced  in areas which were already settled has led to new kinds of 
conflicts and tensions within colonies. Bagh-e-Aman in Vatva area is witness to one such 
tension. Here twelve families were relocated from various parts of the city. Rehabilitation was 
accomplished through the collective efforts of the Islamic Relief Committee, private 
initiatives, and the people themselves. However, residents had rebuilt their lives mostly on 
their own, and without any external support. Now they face the odd problem of not being 
recognised as ‘relocated’ in the same way as the twelve families which have been 
rehabilitated with outside help. Even as state agencies have been forced to take some 
cognisance of the twelve relocated families because of litigation in various courts, they refuse 
to recognise other affected households as displaced. As a result of this unevenness in 
resettlement, about one hundred households are deprived of government schemes or 
compensation. Consequently these households do not even have any hope of being supplied 
with a Voters Identity card.  
 
Secondly, our research team discerned a rather troubling development in these resettlement 
colonies. Since the state has refused to step in to rehabilitate the displaced, Islamic 
organisations have provided the major resources for this purpose. For example, the land on 
which victims have been relocated was mostly purchased by the Islamic Relief Committee 
(IRC). The land deeds, therefore, are with the Islamic Relief Committee, and the organisation 
refuses to give these deeds to the residents. As no land entitlement has been given to the 
victims, people believe with good reason that they live in semi-permanent relief camps, and 
that they have not really been rehabilitated. There have also been instances where the Islamic 
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Relief Committee has imposed its own set of conditionalities on people if they want to live in 
these colonies. Most of these problems emanate from the conflict of priorities of the victims 
and civil society organisations on the one hand, and the IRC on the other. Residents told us 
that the IRC prefers the construction of mosques to health clinics, madrassas to schools, and 
that the organisation insists on dress codes for women, in other words purdah. The residents 
on the other hand, are more concerned about incomes, health, and education for their children. 
In general, there is some evidence that the IRC has been trying to influence people to abandon 
their traditional life practices, and to follow rigid and doctrinaire versions of Islam.4 This is 
the natural outcome of state fundamentalism and neglect of religious minorities; for when 
religious organisations step into the vacuum, they are likely to demand their own price for 
helping people. Fundamentalism always breeds counter-fundamentalism, and it is the lives 
and the futures of ordinary people that are at risk here. In sum these displaced Muslim 
families are fated to remain outside the reach of all the amenities that a ‘Vibrant Gujarat’5 
might perchance offer to those who form an integral part of society and the polity.  For the 
present government these families just do not form an integral part of Gujarati society and 
politics; they have been expelled both spatially and socially to the margins of the city, and 
condemned to live in new forms of ghettos. 
 
 
 Implications of Ghettoisation 
 
Though the Hindus and Muslims in Ahmedabad seem to have preferred to live separately 
since the early eighteenth century, residential segregation did not necessarily mean unequal 
opportunities for members of the communities. They could participate in the socio-economic, 
political and cultural life of the city on their own terms. Today the spatial marginalisation of 
the Muslims indicates their economic, political and social exclusion from the city. The city  
has been reorganised on the principle of ‘single community areas’ where no intercommunity 
mixing is possible (Chaudhary A.B.R 2007 698-99).  Spatial segregation means that the 
children of one community have absolutely no interaction with the children of the other 
community, no mixed schools, no playgrounds in which children of both communities can 
play, no extra curricula activities that can form the basis of a future solidarity, and no 
personal friendships that involve visiting each other’s homes, and that involve inter-dining.  
 
Today Ahmedabad has few residential colonies with mixed populations and is divided almost 
completely into Hindu and Muslim inhabited areas. The difference is that whereas Hindus 
live both in the poverty stricken and in the affluent areas of the city, Muslims live in areas that 
only can be described as ghettos. These ghettos are not just poverty stricken, they are 
deprived of basic amenities, they often lie outside the pale of governance, and they are 
subjected to hateful stereotyping.  Involuntary or forced migration to the ghetto is one 
indication of lack of choices, which arguably is the hallmark of democratic freedom and of 
citizenship rights. The absence of infrastructure in these ghettos in the form of a lack of health 
clinics, educational institutions, provision of clean drinking water, power, proper housing and 
roads, and in a general environmental degradation is another indication of the downgrading of 
social and economic rights. The political pact that sanctions this kind of treatment of a section 
of the population is both exclusionary and oppressive. In the process an entire religious 
minority has been downgraded from citizen to subject.   
                                                 
4 Our research team was threatened by a member of the IRC in Ekta Nagar who wanted to know why we were 
there and proceeded to tell us that he and not the inhabitants would answer all questions. 
5 The electoral slogan of the BJP, head by Chief Minister Narinder Modi, in the December 2007 state assembly 
elections was “Vibrant Gujerat”. 
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Conclusion 
 
Putzel suggests that one of the preconditions of political stability and of holding a society 
together is the inclusive political pact. However, as suggested above, an inclusive political 
pact also requires certain preconditions. For one, political pacts quickly become redundant if 
the political significance of relatively new elites and correspondingly the political 
insignificance of declining elites is neither recognised nor registered in renegotiated political 
pacts. Secondly, whereas politically significant agents and thus contenders for inclusion in the 
political pact can range from political parties to economic and social groups, in ethnically 
divided societies, political prudence dictates that the leaders of at least the politically 
significant ethnic groups are included. This goes a long way in neutralising discontent and 
feelings of marginalisation.  
 
However, leaders of ethnic groups can only become partners in political pacts when their 
communities are not structurally discriminated against economically, politically, and socially. 
History has shown that the exclusion of ethnic groups breeds pervasive discontent and can 
result in armed struggle and consequent political instability. In the city of Ahmedabad 
however, an entirely different kind of exclusion of the Muslim minority community has taken 
place through historical processes. One visible process is the ghettoisation of the Muslim 
community, which has preferred to herd together in ill-serviced and ramshackle housing 
clusters on the periphery of the city. Economically, the Muslim community has been more or 
less marginalised because the location of these ghettos prevents access to meaningful job 
opportunities. Poorly connected by road, these ghettos have forced a once vibrant working 
class to join the ranks of informal labour. Socially the Muslim community is subjected to 
discrimination, hateful stereotyping and exclusion. 
 
Spatial marginalisation of the Muslim community is one visible indication of the general 
marginalisation of this community from collective life, let alone partnership in a political pact 
that would ensure stability. Political elites belonging to the majority Hindu and Jain 
communities have ensured that the Muslims are deprived of a viable role in the economy, 
equal status in society, and voice in political decisions. Today, for the ruling party of the 
religious right that has controlled the state since the mid nineteen-seventies, the Muslim 
minority simply does not count. The predicament of this community seems to have little 
bearing on decisions taken and not taken.  
 
An inclusive political pact would have meant incorporating the leaders of this fifteen percent 
of the population.  This would have ensured access to structures of opportunity for the 
Muslim community.  However, the community seems to have been marginalised so 
completely that the existing political pact can continue to lay down rules for collective life, 
with neither the presence nor the inclusion of this group.  Moreover, this exclusion seems to 
have ensured some measure of peace, if we measure this by the absence of conflict that 
borders on war. 
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